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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 20, 1983, a woman told the Duval County, Florida, Sheriff's
Department that an unidentified man robbed and sexually assaulted her., In
writing its report on the incident, the Sheriff's Department used the woman's
full name, thereby making her identity part of a public record.' Relying on that
record, the local Florida Star newspaper published a story on the incident with
her full name, thereby violating a Florida statute that made publishing a rape
victim's name in the mass media unlawful.3
The victim successfully held the newspaper civilly liable in the state
courts.' Before the United States Supreme Court, however, the newspaper pre-
vailed, another victor in the Court's continued propensity to place first amend-
ment interests of the media before privacy concerns of the individual.5 In hold-
ing for the newspaper, the Court also may have killed off the tort for truthful
publication of private facts,' a vague cause of action whose application has
spawned a confusing array of standards7 under which challenges to the media
seem doomed to fail.8
The Florida Star case dramatizes the tension between the privacy protec-
tions accorded individuals through state statute and common law doctrine and
the rights of a free press encompassed in the first amendment.9 While the Su-
preme Court addressed the subject numerous times in recent years,10 the Court
never resolved the tension with explicit doctrine. Even using rather unclear stan-
dards, though, the Court tipped the balance heavily in favor of the media by
1. Florida Star v. B.J.F.. 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2605 (1989).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2606.
5. See infra notes 44-90 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
7. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 COR-
NELL L. REV. 291, 293 (1983). The author states, "The confusion that has attended the effort to create a firm
legal contour for the tort merely reflects the inherent difficulty under the first amendment of treating truthful
speech as tortious." Id. See Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 330 (1966); Comment, Privacy, Defamation, and the First Amendment: The Implications
of Time. Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 926, 940 (1967).
8. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
9. The first amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." US. CoNsr. amend. I.
10. See infra notes 56-90 and accompanying text.
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consistently relying on an underlying notion that only an unfettered press can
create the free flow of information essential to our form of government."1
Measured against that notion, the privacy interests in this tort will likely
always be found wanting.12 Indeed, the media prevailed so resoundingly before
the Supreme Court in recent years' 3 that this privacy cause of action, some-
times called the right to be let alone,' 4 was considered somewhat an endangered
species. 5 In the Florida Star case, the Court once again avoided setting any
broad standard by which courts and the media could operate.'8 Without that
standard, the Court once again applied a series of unsatisfying precedents 7 and
once again held for the media, refusing to find their exercise of publishing
truthful facts as an activity that a state may constitutionally proscribe. In doing
so, however, the Court all but pronounced that species of tort extinct.' 8
In examining how this particular tort has been driven to near extinction,
this Note will explore the historical development of the conflict between privacy
and first amendment interests.' This Note will discuss how the Court applied
those precedents to the Florida Star case and further expanded the media bul-
wark against future privacy actions.20 Further, this Note will suggest what little
remains in the way of private fact tort action, why current distaste for the me-
dia should not confuse critics into thinking this tort could be useful, and thus
why this tort should not be missed."
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Right to Privacy
The concept of individual privacy 2 arose only a century ago, in the famous
law journal article of Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis (later United
States Supreme Court justice).' 3 Concerned over press revelations about the
I 1. In each case, the Court emphasized the narrowness of its finding, limiting the application of its decision
to the discrete facts before the Court at the time. See infra notes 56-90 and accompanying text.
12. Some commentators believe this tort could never coexist with the first amendment. See, e.g., Zimmer-
man, supra note 7, at 293. Zimmerman suggests that even the most enthusiastic advocates of a right to privacy,
including Warren and Brandeis, recognized that an absolute protection "would intolerably hamper human dis-
course." Id. See also Zuckman, Invasion of Privacy-Some Communicative Torts Whose Time Has Gone, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 259-61 (1990). Zuckman calls the private facts tort "ill-conceived" because it at-
tempts to protect individual interests that are insubstantial while creating dangers to freedom of expression.
13. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
15. Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 293-94, 362. See also Note, Privacy and the Press: A Necessary Tension,
18 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 949, 952 (1985) (privacy tort law in state of limbo).
16. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. at 2608-09. See Note, Florida Star v. B.J.F.: Can the State Regulate
the Press in the Interest of Protecting the Privacy of Rape Victims, 41 MERCER L. REv. 1061, 1096 (1990).
17. Id. at 2608-13.
18. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 22-90 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 94-142 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
23. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The article is considered per-
haps the outstanding illustration of the influence of legal periodicals on the courts. See W. KEETON. PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 849 (5th ed. 1984).
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Boston social scene,24 they proposed a right not to have information about an
individual's personal life exposed to the general public through the press.2 5
While their proposal for a private facts tort gained recognition slowly, 28 it devel-
oped into one of the four distinct categories contained in the tort for invasion of
privacy, identified by Dean Prosser27 and adopted by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.28 Eventually, whether by common law or statute, nearly every state
adopted some form of the private facts tort.29
The tort contains three basic elements: (1) giving publicity to facts, (2)
that a reasonable person would consider private and highly offensive if exposed,
and (3) that are not of legitimate public concern.30 Thus, a plaintiff must show
that the information was private 1 and that the defendant disseminated the in-
formation widely.3 2 The latter implicates the mass media but leaves individual
gossips immune from liability for disseminating private facts.33 This exemption
for individuals stems from practical considerations, that is, the difficulty in at-
tempting to restrict such individualistic yet widespread behavior as gossiping.34
The defendant media in a private facts case may defeat the action by
showing that the public had a legitimate interest in the disclosed facts.35 In
other words, the courts ask, "Are the facts newsworthy?" This defense has
evolved into an exception to tort liability for "matters of public concern."36 Al-
24. See Kalven, supra note 7, at 329.
25. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23. at 195-96. "The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become
a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery." Id. at 196. Cf. L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 15-1, at 1302 (2d ed. 1988) (privacy is "nothing less than society's limiting principle").
26. The first appellate state court to consider such a claim after the Warren-Brandeis article rejected the
notion. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The court denied the claim
"that a man has a right to pass through this world . . . without having his picture published, his business enter-
prises discussed . . . or his eccentricities commented upon. ... Id. at 544, 64 N.E. at 443.
27. See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
28. In addition to the category for the embarrassing publication of private facts, the categories are: intrusion
on an individual's seclusion or solitude, publicity that places the individual in a false light, and appropriation of an
individual's name or likeness. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-52E (1977) (publication of private
facts is § 652D). See Prosser, supra note 27, at 389.
29. S. METCALF. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLISHERS. BROADCASTERS & REPORTERS § 2.03, at 2-11 to 2-
16 (1984). See Zimmerman. supra note 7, at 365-66 (citing 36 states that have recognized the private facts tort).
Some states have refused to recognize the tort. They include New York, Nebraska, Utah, and most recently
North Carolina. See Note, Hall v. Post: North Carolina Rejects Claim of lnvasion of Privacy by Truthful Publi-
cation of Embarrassing Facts, 67 N.C.L. REV. 1474, 1487 (1989).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
31. Id. at comment b.
32. Id. at comment a.
33. The existence of the mass publication requirement immediately taints the tort. Zimmerman, supra note
7, at 301. The requirement suggests that in this area the press has significantly less freedom of speech than does
the private individual. Id.
34. Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 337. One court has said that abandoning the publication requirement
would expand the concept of invasion of privacy beyond manageable limits. LaFontaine v. Family Drug Stores.
Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 66, 73, 360 A.2d 899, 902 (Conn. C.P. 1976).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment d (1977). See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 299-
300.
36. The two concepts are often used interchangeably in discussing a defendant member of the media's de-
fense to publishing a private fact. In Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 425 U.S.
998. the court held that publishing private facts is not protected by the first amendment, absent the privilege of
newsworthiness. Id. at 1128. See Note, supra note 15, at 959-61.
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though the courts have not simply accepted the editorial judgment of the media
as the determinator of newsworthiness, the vast majority of cases deferred to
the media on publication decisions by holding that what is printed is by defini-
tion of legitimate public interest.
3 7
Using this reasoning, the courts virtually assure the preeminence of the
media in a private facts dispute.38 Most jurisdictions that recognize the private
facts tort allow the newsworthiness defense, perhaps because of the potential
first amendment problems in allowing someone other than the media to deter-
mine what gets published. 39 Even the Restatement notes that it has not been
established with certainty that liability in this tort is consistent with the free
speech and free press provisions of the first amendment.4 0 Numerous commen-
tators have pointed critically to the tort's elements, and even its basic concept,
as simply too vague to be pitted against a constitutional right.4 1 Amid these
constitutional concerns, the courts' efforts to mold standards for adjudication,
then, often create more questions than provide satisfying answers.42
B. First Amendment Interests
Generally, the first amendment rights of free speech and a free press are
viewed as guarantors of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail" and self-government thrive.4  The Supreme Court first dis-
cussed the concept in a 1936 case4 5 in which the Court stated that the first
amendment was intended to protect "such free and general discussion of public
matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent
exercise of their rights as citizens.146 This broad concept creates the single,
common thread running through the Supreme Court decisions balancing first
amendment concerns and individual privacy interests.4 7
The privacy interests at stake here, dealing with governance of the conduct
of others who intrude on one's life, should be distinguished from privacy rights
that immunize an individual's actions from government interference (such as
37. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 353 n.320 (also pointing out that some scholars view this result as
inevitable).
38. See Kalven, supra note 7, at 337 (suggesting that the newsworthiness defense obliterates the private facts
tort).
39. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 300 n.34.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D special note (1977).
41. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 7; Kalven, supra note 7; Comment, supra note 7; Zuckman, supra
note 12. See supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text.
42. Zuckman, supra note 12 at 262-63.
43. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
44. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN. FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
45. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
46. Id. at 250 (quoting 2 T. COOLEY. COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 886 (8th cd. 1927)).
47. The Court has said, "Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a
civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary
value on freedom of speech and of press." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). This case contains
language that reflects the importance that public disclosure be "of public interest" to receive first amendment
protection: "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
their period." Id. See Katz, Unauthorized Biographies and Other "Books of Revelations'" A Celebrity's Legal
Recourse to a Truthful Public Disclosure, 36 UCLA L. REV. 815, 827 (1989).
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use of contraceptives or aborting pregnancies).4 8 In addition, these publication
rights should be distinguished from the companion area of the publication of
falsehoods, libel and defamation. That area, in which individuals aggrieved by
the dissemination of damaging untruths seek redress, is well charted when com-
pared to the area of truthful publication of private facts.' 9 The areas differ fun-
damentally in two ways. First, the Supreme Court has held that false speech
can be regulated by the states because it has no constitutional value.50 The
Court reasoned that such speech does not contribute to the free flow of informa-
tion in public debate."1 While false speech is considered constitutionally value-
less, accurate speech deserves protection from state laws restricting its free ex-
change.5 2 Second, injury caused by false or defamatory publication can be
mitigated to a certain extent by subsequent publication, while injury caused by
truthful publication cannot..5 3 Truth, then, offers a complete defense in the line
of cases involving libel.54
Against the backdrop of the first amendment, the Supreme Court has fash-
ioned evaluative standards of sorts for truthful publication of private facts from
four primary cases. 55
1. Cox Broadcasting
The first private facts case to focus on the first amendment rather than
state law aspects of the dispute was Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.5 6 In Cox,
the father of a deceased rape victim filed suit against an Atlanta television sta-
tion that obtained his daughter's name from a court record and broadcast her
name on a news program.57 The Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Georgia
48. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 740 (1989).
49. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. V.
Hepps. 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc. 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Henry
v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivanc376
U.S. 254 (1964).
50. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 312 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279).
51. See id. at 313.
52. See id. The author suggests the Court has also made clear that to promote widespread circulation of
ideas and truthful information the Court will provide some "breathing space for accurate speech by extending
protection for some falsehoods." Id. (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272).
53. See. e.g., W. HOPKINs. ACTUAL MALICE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER Times v. Sullivan 10 (1989); M.
NIN IER. NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.02[G], at 1-42 (1984); Note, The Imposition of Strict Civil
Liability on a Media Defendant for Publication of Truthful. Lawfully Obtained Information, 18 STETSON L.
REV 119, 130 (1988).
54. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
55. The first apparent ease of the victim of a sexual attack brought against a communications medium for
invasion of privacy occurred less than 30 years ago. Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d
147 (1962). See Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Reporting of
Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107, 108 (1963).
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Supreme Court noted that it would not foreclose an interpre-
tation of the New York statute to allow damages where the revelations published outraged the community's
notions of decency. Id. at 383 n.7. "This case presents no questions whether truthful publication of such matter
could be constitutionally proscribed," the Court said. Id.
56. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). See Note, supra note 15, at 951 n.20.
57. Cox, 420 U.S. at 472-74.
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statute prohibiting the publication of a rape victim's name. In reaching that
decision, the Court focused on two factors: the source of the information and
the potential chilling effect of restricting the publication of truthful informa-
tion.58 Because the state allowed the court records to be public, the Court rea-
soned, it could not prohibit the media from publishing that information59 and
jeopardize the strong public interest in knowing about governmental opera-
tions.60 While the public interest in government operations relates to new-
sworthiness, the Court did not specify "newsworthiness" as a defense.6 1 The
Court noted the important role the media plays in ensuring fair trials62 and
concluded that privacy interests should be protected by means that avoid public
documentation or other disclosure of private information, not by restricting the
media.63 Thus, the Court immunized the press from liability for accurate re-
ports about information contained in judicial records.6 4
The second justification for denying liability was the fear of a chilling ef-
fect upon the media in its pursuit of information. The Court stated that a rule
making public records available to the media but forbidding their publication if
they offend the sensibilities of a reasonable person "would invite timidity and
self-censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of many items that would
otherwise be published and that should be made available to the public."66
While finding the state's restriction on the media unconstitutional, the
Court cautiously limited its holding to the particular facts presented.67 Because
the interests of privacy and those of the free press are both rooted in traditions
and significant concerns of society, the Court reasoned, it is not appropriate to
address questions broader than those presented. 8 The Court left unanswered
whether the media could ever be held liable for publishing truthful private facts
and whether the media's protection extended beyond public judicial records.
58. Id. at 496.
59. Id. at 487-97. See J. NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.36, at 940 (2d ed.
1983).
60. Linder, When Names Are Not News, They're Negligence: Media Liability for Personal Injuries Result-
ing from the Publication of Accurate Information, 52 UMKC L. REv. 421, 428 (1984).
61. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
62. Cox, 420 U.S. at 492. See also Note, A Constitutional Right of Access to Pretrial Documents: A Missed
Opportunity in Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press, 62 IND. LJ. 735 (1986-87) (public policy concerns
give great weight to finding the existence of a constitutional right of access to documents used in all judicial
proceedings).
63. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496. The Court stated, "If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial pro-
ceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private infor-
mation. Their political institutions must weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know and
of the press to publish." Id. Ironically, in his dissent in the Florida Star case, Justice White contends that, when
the State of Florida attempted to do exactly what the Court suggested here in Cox, the state's statute was over-
turned. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
64. Cox, 420 U.S. at 491.
65. Id. at 496.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 491.
68. Id. The Fifth Circuit analyzed the situation similarly in a private facts case, saying, "Our constitutional
warrant authorizes us to decide only those 'cases and controversies' actually before us. Nowhere is the wisdom of
that restriction more apparent than in cases like the present one, which poses a conflict between two fundamental
aspects of individual liberty ...." Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1989).
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2. Landmark Communications
In the next major case,"9 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 7
the Court partly answered one of those questions. The Court held unconstitu-
tional a Virginia statute imposing criminal sanctions for publication of the con-
fidential proceedings of a state judicial review commission .7 1 The Court said
that the first amendment prohibited criminal punishment of nonparticipants in a
confidential judicial proceeding for publishing truthful information regarding
the proceedings.7 2 However, once again, the Court insisted on limiting the hold-
ing, refusing to state broadly that truthful reporting about public officials in
connection with their duties was insulated from criminal punishment by the first
amendment73 and leaving open the question of whether the media could ever be
held liable. The Court did mention that the state's interest in protecting the
reputation of its judges and integrity of its courts was not considered sufficient
to justify criminal punishment for publication.7 4 That balancing consideration
foreshadowed the standard adopted in the next case.
3. Daily Mail
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,7 5 a West Virginia newspaper arti-
cle identified a juvenile murder suspect in violation of a statute that prohibited
publication of the names of juvenile court defendants .7  The newspaper learned
about a shooting by monitoring a police band frequency and obtained the name
of the suspect from witnesses, the police, and a local prosecutor.7 7 In its deci-
sion, the Court expressly declined to follow its approach in Cox, indicating the
source of the information was not a controlling factor.7 8 Instead, the Court ex-
amined the state's justifications for its statutes79 and introduced the strict scru-
tiny test,80 stating that a state may place content-based restrictions on media
publication only where they furthered a state interest of the highest order.8 1
West Virginia's interests in protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offenders
and improving their prospects for future employment were not deemed suffi-
69. Following the Cox holding, the Court decided another private facts case that involved court proceedings
in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). There, a trial judge chose not to close a
juvenile court proceeding, as he was permitted by statute. After reporters attended, he attempted to enjoin them
from printing the name or photograph of the I 1-year-old defendant. The Supreme Court found his order unconsti-
tutional, noting that once truthful information was publicly revealed, the court could not constitutionally restrain
its dissemination. Id. at 309-11.
70. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
71. Id. at 844-45.
72. Id. at 837-42.
73. Id. at 837-38.
74. Id. at 841.
75. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
76. Id. at 99.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 103.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 102.
81. Id.
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ciently substantial to justify blanket media restrictions on juvenile
proceedings.82
The Court also introduced two other elements for use in the evaluation of
state restrictions. First, the Court said a state cannot punish truthful informa-
tion about a "matter of public significance, '83 a standard similar to the new-
sworthiness test.84 Second, absent a compelling state interest, a state cannot
punish publication "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information."8 5 As
before, the Court limited its holdings to the facts at hand and expressly refused
to consider whether unlawfully obtaining information would negate this
protection.86
4. Globe Newspaper
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,8" a Massachusetts statute cate-
gorically excluded the public from trials of sexual offenses involving juvenile
victims.88 In holding the statute invalid, the Court used the strict scrutiny anal-
ysis and found compelling the state's interest in protecting minors from trauma
and/or embarrassment and encouraging others to testify.8 However, the Court
determined that the mandatory closure rule was too broad a means of advanc-
ing those interests and suggested judicial discretion be applied on a case-by-case
basis. 10
5. Summary of Factors
From these cases, the relevant factors to be employed in determining
whether a state may prohibit publication of truthful private facts appear to be:91
(i) whether the information came from a public judicial record, although confi-
dential judicial proceedings were not off limits and protection for other public
records was left as an open question; (2) whether the information was obtained
lawfully, although the cases refuse to address the issue of unlawfully obtained
information and leave open the question of whether the media would be pro-
tected if a third party unlawfully obtained the information and lawfully
presented it to the media;92 (3) whether the information was newsworthy, al-
82. Id. at 104. The Court suggested a case-by-case determination on whether restrictions were necessary.
83. Id. at 103.
84. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
85. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103. This phrase, heavily relied on in the Florida Star case, was introduced with
the qualifier that such a rule was suggested by prior cases. Id. In the dissent in the Florida Star case, Justice
White strongly objects to the majority's reliance on the phrase as precedent. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2615
(White, J., dissenting). The case is generally considered to stand for that proposition, however.
86. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105-06.
87. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
88. Id. at 607-08.
89. Id. Ironically, in the Florida Star case, the Court rejected the state's interest in encouraging other vic-
tims of sexual attacks to come forward as insufficient. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611.
90. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607-08. See Note, What Ever Happened to 'the Right to Know'?: Access
to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REv. I I 1I, 1118 (1987).
91. Kovner, Recent Developments in Intrusion, Private Facts, False Light and Commercialization Claims, in
3 COMM. L. INST. (PLI) 811 (1988).
92. See. e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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though only Daily Mail recognized this defense; (4) whether such a prohibition
would have a chilling effect, although this factor was emphasized only in Cox;
and (5) whether the prohibition served, a state interest of the highest order in
the least restrictive means possible, the Court's nearly insurmountable hurdle of
strict scrutiny.93
III. FLORIDA STAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
In the Florida Star case, the Court applied these relevant factors in a
sometimes puzzling manner, solidified the media's protection against liability
for publishing truthful private facts, and seemingly eliminated the private facts
tort cause of action.
A. Case Background
The Florida Star, an 18,000-circulation newspaper in Jacksonville, Flor-
ida, 94 printed a regular feature called "Police Reports," which contained brief
articles describing local criminal incidents under police investigation.95 After
B.J.F.98 made her report to the Duval County Sheriff's Department, the depart-
ment placed the report, which inadvertently included her full name, in the press
room.97 The room contained signs stating that the names of rape victims were
not matters of public record and were not to be published.' The prohibition
came from a state statute making it unlawful to print, publish, or broadcast in
any instrument of mass communication the name of a victim of a sexual of-
fense.9 ' In addition to the statute's prohibition, the newspaper's internal policy
forbade publication of a rape victim's name.100 The newspaper's reporter-
trainee, who wrote down the information from the police report, knew of the
sign and the newspaper's policy when she copied B.J.F.'s full name.' 0 ' The arti-
cle appeared as one of 54 police blotter stories in that day's edition.' 0 '
B.J.F. filed suit against the Sheriffs Department and the Florida Star, but
settled before trial with the Sheriffs Department for $2,500. The trial court' 03
93. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 102. Justice Burger, writing for the majority, concedes that "state action to
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." Id.
94. Florida Star. 109 S. Ct. at 2605.
95. Id.
96. B.J.F. was substituted for the appellee's full name to preserve her privacy. Id. at 2605.
97. Id.
98. Id., at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
99. The statute reads: "Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense victim. -
No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed, published, or broadcast, in any
instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any
sexual offense within this chapter." FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987).
100. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2606.
101. Id.
102. Id. The article read: "[B.J.F.] reported on Thursday, October 20, she was crossing Brentwood Park,
which is in the 500 block of Golfair Boulevard, enroute to her bus stop, when an unknown black man ran up
behind the lady and placed a knife to her neck and told her not to yell. The suspect then undressed the lady and
had sexual intercourse with her before fleeing the scene with her 60 cents, Timex watch and gold necklace. Patrol
efforts have been suspended concerning this incident because of lack of evidence." Id.
103. In a day-long trial, in the Circuit Court in Duval County, Florida, B.J.F. testified that she had suffered
emotional distress from the publication of her name. She said that she heard about the article from fellow workers
1991]
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held the newspaper per se negligent based on its violation of the statute"0' and
specifically held the statute constitutional as reflecting a proper balance between
the first amendment and privacy rights.10 5
B. Holdings and Analysis
In reversing the state courts, 106 the Supreme Court once again refused to
address the basic validity of the private facts tort. As in Cox, the Court would
not hold broadly that truthful publication may never be punished consistent
with the first amendment 07 and would not answer the less sweeping question of
whether truthful publication may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liabil-
ity.108 However, the Court noted that without exception it had upheld the press'
right to publish when it conflicted with personal privacy rights.109 While the
Court emphasized that it resolved those conflicts and the Florida Star case only
as each arose in a discrete factual context,110 the media's winning streak re-
mained intact.
The Court held that where a newspaper publishes truthful information that
was lawfully obtained, punishment may be imposed only when narrowly tailored
to further a state interest of the highest order."1 The Court said that Florida's
statute did not properly further a state interest for three reasons: (1) because
the newspaper obtained the information lawfully, that is, the state made the
information available through one of its own agencies, the state retained a less
restrictive (and less constitutionally intrusive) way of safeguarding significant
interests on which publication may impinge; 12  (2) the state imposed a broad
negligence per se standard in which liability follows automatically from publica-
tion, instead of the common-law privacy action standard that disclosure had to
be highly offensive to a reasonable person, as determined on a case-by-case ba-
and acquaintances, that her mother had received several threatening phone calls from a man who said he would
rape her daughter again, that B.J.F. had to change her phone number and residence, to seek police protection, and
to obtain mental health counseling. The Florida Star, in defense, said the newspaper had learned B.J.F.'s name
from the police report and inadvertently violated its internal rule against publishing the names of sexual offense
victims. Id.
104. Id. The judge instructed the jury that it could award punitive damages to B.J.F. if it found the newspa-
per had acted with reckless indifference to the rights of others. The jury then awarded B.J.F. S75,000 in compen-
satory damages and S25,000 in punitive damages. Id.
105. Id.
106. When the newspaper appealed, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the holding, 499 So. 2d 883
(1986), stating that a rape victim's name is of a private nature and not to be published as a matter of law. Florida
Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2606. The Florida Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Id. at 2607.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2609. The Court stated, "We continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the
interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles
that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case." Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. In other cases, the Court has held that the right of the press to publish truth overcame asserted
interests other than personal privacy. Id. at 2608 n.6.
Ill. Id. at 2613.
112. Id. at 2611.
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sis;" 5 and (3) the statute was underinclusive because it proscribed publication
in the mass media but not the spread of information by other means, such as
"backyard gossip.""'" The Court's overarching concern, mentioned but not dis-
cussed, was the "public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemina-
tion of truth.""15
In evaluating the case, the Court maintained that Cox was not controlling
because it involved courtroom records. The Court went on, however, to use a
standard derived from Cox that public judicial records may not be restricted,
saying its holding would be limited to information obtained from public records,
"more specifically, from judicial records" maintained in connection with a pub-
lic prosecution and open to the public." 6 Instead of Cox, the Court said it relied
on the "lawfully obtained" standard from Daily Mail. Because the newspaper
lawfully obtained the rape information, the paper could not be held liable. 17 As
in Globe Newspaper, the Court blamed the government for failing to protect its
interest in keeping the victim's name out of the public record and contended
that the media should not be responsible for knowing whether the information
contained in a public record is anything other than information available for
publication. 18 However, in Globe Newspaper, a judge chose to release the gov-
ernment information. In the Florida Star case, the release was inadvertent." 9
As the Court suggested, a rule forcing the media to prune from public records
anything that might be unlawful to publish would prove onerous."l 0 However,
using the Court's own aversion to broad holdings in private facts cases, it could
be argued that in the particular facts of this case the media already knew the
report contained information that was unlawful to publish. The "onerous bur-
den" of knowing what information to prune from the public record consisted of
reading the signs posted near the reports that said rape victims' names could not
be used.
In this argument, as well as in several others, the Court displayed an ex-
traordinary reluctance again to fetter the press by placing any burden on infor-
mation-gathering from public records. The Court said that punishing the media
for publishing already-public information would not advance state interests."'
Appellee B.J.F. had argued that the statute furthered three closely related in-
terests: the privacy of victims of sexual offenses; the physical safety of such
victims, who may become targets of retaliation if their names are known to
113. Id. at 2612. Justice White said in dissent that the per se standard simply means the state legislature,
reflecting the will of people, determined that publication is categorically offensive to a reasonable person. The
determination is not for the court to make, he said. Id. at 2617 (White, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2612-13.
115. The Court relied on the common thread in these privacy cases, the concern for hampering the free flow
of information. Id. at 2609 (quoting Cox, 420 U.S. at 491).
116. Id. at 2609.
117. Id. at 2609-10.
118. Id. at 2609. The government retains ample means of safeguarding significant interests upon which pub-
lication may impinge, including rape victim's anonymity, according to the Court. It stated, "[W]here information
is entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than punishing truthful publication almost always exists for
guarding against the dissemination of private facts." Id.
119. Id. at 2606.
120. Id. at 2610.
121. Id.
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their assailants; and the goal of encouraging such victims to report the offenses
without fear of exposure. 122 While the Court considered these interests "highly
significant," it believed that, where information is entrusted to the government,
a means less drastic than punishing truthful publication almost always exists. 123
That less drastic means would be to place responsibility on the government to
safeguard privacy interests by restricting the contents of public records.1 2 4
While not ideal from the media's perspective (favoring open access to govern-
ment records), the Court's guideline at least removes the dispute from the pri-
vacy tort arena and places it where more solid doctrine exists.' 25
The Court applied one of its other Daily Mail standards and concluded
that the newspaper article contained information of paramount public impor-
tance:126 the commission and investigation of a violent crime that had been re-
ported to authorities. The question in Florida Star, however, could be seen as
not the newsworthiness of crime information but the newsworthiness of names
within that information. How much does a name add to the level of newsworthi-
ness? A significant amount, according to the media. 2  Yet, while the media
generally consider names essential to newsworthiness, 28 they frequently debate
the value of including names in certain crime reports, particularly rape re-
ports. 12 9 Withholding certain victim names would not likely thwart the general
122. Id. at 2611.
123. Id. at 2609. The Court said, "[lIt is highly anomalous to sanction persons other than the source of its
release." Id. at 2610.
124. In the dissent, Justice White points out that the State of Florida took steps to accomplish just that.
While the state was not asking the media to do its job, he said, the media should "respect simple standards of
decency and refrain from publishing" when mistakes occur in compiling records. White's plea smacks more of
wishful thinking than legal doctrine that could be used as a basis for promoting privacy interests over the first
amendment. Id. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
125. Instead of post-publication liability, the issue becomes one of prior restraint, where the Supreme Court
has found first amendment interests of a free press to outweigh governmental interests in restricting information.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the Pentagon Papers case, where the Court held
the government failed to meet its heavy burden of justifying its request to block publication of federal documents
relating to the nation's involvement in the Vietnam war). But see Supreme Court Won't Allow CNN to Air Tapes
of Noriega Telephone Calls in Jail, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1990, at B5, col. 5 (the Court, in a 7-2 decision
rendered without explanation, refused to lift a gag order preventing Cable News Network from broadcasting tape
recordings of jailhouse conversations made by prisoner and former Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega).
126. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611.
127. Wolf, Thomason, & LaRocque, The Right to Know vs. the Right of Privacy: Newspaper Identification
of Crime Victims, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 503, 503 (1987). In Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271,
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 326, the Fifth Circuit found a logical nexus between the rape victim's name and new-
sworthiness in a documentary questioning the guilt of a man convicted of rape. "Communicating that this particu-
lar victim was a real person with roots in the community, and showing [the television station's] knowledge of the
details of the attack upon her, were of unique importance to the credibility and persuasive force of the story." Id.
at 274. The court refused to hold that a rape victim's name is always a matter of public concern even if her rape is
a matter of public concern. Id. at 275. But see Note, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: Balancing Freedom of the Press
and the Right to Privacy upon Publication of a Rape Victim's Identity, 35 S.D.L. REv. 94, 112 (1990) ("There
are times, however, when free press values are little served by the reporting of the rape victim's identity.").
128. Linder, supra note 60, at 421-22.
129. See, e.g., Wolf, Thomason & LaRocque, supra note 127, at 503; Groups Urge Legislation to Protect
Rape Victims' Names, U.P.I., June 29, 1990 (Wire service BC cycle); Collins, The Media's Secret, Newsday,
June 1I, 1990, pt. I1, at 4 (Nassau & Suffolk ed.); Should We Reveal Her Name: The Press Still Protects the
Central Park Jogger, NEWSWEEK, April 2, 1990, at 48. See also, Katz, supra note 47, at 830 (discussing the
public versus private figure dichotomy).
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state interest in the dissemination of crime information,130 but it would place a
government restriction on the media that the Court would rather see imple-
mented through the government rather than against the media.131 The media,
meanwhile, would prefer that any restrictions come from within."32 Indeed,
most publishers and broadcasters voluntarily refrain from using rape victims'
names, a policy dictated at least in part by public sentiment. 3' For the media,
the issue is not whether they should or even want to publish rape victims'
names. The issue is who will hold the blue pencil over newspaper and broadcast
stories, the media or the government. Where an unfettered press is still consid-
ered essential for the government to function as intended, the media need to
keep as tight a grip as possible on the blue pencil.
In its final argument that the statute did not serve a state interest of the
highest order, the Court labeled Florida's statute underinclusive and in doing so
stepped into a morass. If the state attempts to punish dissemination of a rape
victim's name, the Court said, the state should demonstrate its commitment to
advancing that interest by applying the prohibition to the "smalltime dissemina-
tor as well as the media giant."'34 Such a statute would be unenforceable and
unwarranted. Even with its erratic development, the private facts tort never
placed liability for publishing information on individuals. The tort purposefully
covered the mass media as the prime disseminators of information who could
inflict more harm, or at least more widespread harm, than simple wagging
tongues."35 In addition, enforcement of such a statute would be impossible."16
130. States frequently forbid the use of minors' names in criminal proceedings in juvenile courts, but those
arc defendant names rather than victim names. See, e.g., Montesano v. Las Vegas Review Journal, 688 P.2d 1081
(1983), cert. denied. 466 U.S. 959 (1984) (record of juvenile offense confidential by statute, but fact that offense
became public inadvertently in subsequent court proceedings precluded claim for violation of statute). In Florida
Star, the Court relies on Daily Mail to compare restricting publication of a juvenile offender's name to a crime
victim's name. Justice White vehemently disagreed, saying, "Surely the rights of those accused of crimes and
those who are their victims must differ with respect to privacy concerns." Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2615
(White, J., dissenting). See Note, supra note 127, at Ill; Note, supra note 16, at 1096.
131. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
132. See. e.g., Privacy and the Press, Christian Sci. Mon., May 17, 1990 (Ideas Section), at 13.
133. See Wolf, Thomason & LaRocque, supra note 127, at 503. The authors note the media have become
more sensitive to concerns of crime victims in recent years for several reasons. The reasons include the media's
own credibility studies, which indicate the public believes the media often take advantage of ordinary people who
are victims of circumstances; the 1982 President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, which recommended names
and addresses of victims not be made public; and, increased public awareness of the victims' plight through sup-
port groups, and increased attention to the problem by the media themselves. Id. at 503-04. From their survey of
newspapers nationwide, the authors concluded that 90% of those responding did not print names or addresses of
rape victims. Id. at 505. The Los Angeles Times estimated that not more than 10 newspapers in the country
publish rape victims' names. Japenga, How a Paper's Explicit Rape Policy Affects a Town, L.A. Times, July 18,
1989, pt. 5 (View Section) at I, col. 2 (home ed.); Note, supra note 127, at 113.
134. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2613. The defendant 18,000-circulation newspaper in this case could hardly
be classified as a media giant.
135. Zimmerman suggests that society never placed a premium on prohibiting gossip, that it serves a vital
social role, and that the media only perform a gossip function no longer so extensive among individuals because of
the growth of less intimate communities. Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 331-33.
In assessing the social bases of the privacy tort, commentator Robert Post concluded that the Restatement
settled for a workable rule-of-thumb for liability, differentiating allowable private communications (to another
person or small group) from actionable public communications (to so many persons that the matter is substan-
tially certain to become public knowledge). Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL L. REv. 957, 993, 995 (1989). He states: "We can interpret the publicity require-
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C. Aftermath of Florida Star
The argument of underinclusiveness pinpoints again the difficulty in defin-
ing the private facts tort. If after a century it remains so poorly defined and
oddly applied, what hope for its clarification and effective use remain? As three
justices remarked in the Florida Star dissent, this case may put an end to the
private facts tort.1 3 7 Even though the Supreme Court will not explicitly rule out
the tort, the Court seems unwilling to sanction its application. 1 38 In cases since
Florida Star, the media's immunity to the private facts tort remains strong.
Two cases involved inadvertent inclusion of nonpublic information in public
records, facts similar to the Florida Star case, and both holdings favored the
media."3 9
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, the standards seem more muddled but the message grows in-
creasingly clearer: The first amendment trumps the individual privacy concerns
in the truthful publication of private facts. Where the media essentially deter-
mine whether they meet the standard of newsworthiness, where the state statute
virtually never rises to the level of promoting a state interest of the highest
order, where publication by the mass media cannot be proscribed without re-
stricting the tongues of individual gossips, the possibility that a plaintiff will
ment, then, as an attempt to ensure that public communications comply with minimum standards of civility. while
liberating private communications from the threat of legal enforcement of such restraints." Id. at 992.
136. Id. The Court cited as precedent Daily Mail, in which it held that a statute was insufficiently tailored to
the state's interest in protecting anonymity where it restricted only newspapers, not the electronic or other forms
of publication, from identifying juvenile offenders. Finding a statute underinclusive because it does not cover
different forms of mass communication cannot be considered analogous to inclusion of backyard gossips as instru-
ments of communication. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia faults the statute for omitting backyard gossips, say-
ing, "[T]his law has every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon the press but not
upon itself." Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2614 (Scalia, J., concurring). See Note, supra note 127, at 116.
137. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2618 (White, J., dissenting).
138. Justice White laments: "I doubt that there remain any 'private facts' which persons may assume will
not be published in the newspapers or broadcast on television." Id. One commentator suggests that the Court's
actions continue a legacy of fostering an irresponsible press. Note, The Florida Star v. B.J.F- Is Journalistic
Irresponsibility Paramount to Individual Privacy?, 16 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 93, 93 (1989).
139. Boettger v. Loverro, 521 Pa. 366, 555 A.2d 1234, vacated, Easton Publishing Co. v. Boettger. 110 S.Ct.
225 (1989). and Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 296
(1989). In Boettger, the Pennsylvania statute prohibited transcripts of conversations intercepted by wiretapping
from being disclosed. 521 Pa. 366 at 370-71, 555 A.2d at 1236-37. In a preliminary hearing, however, a prosecu-
tor inadvertently attached a transcript to a document filed with the court. A reporter obtained a copy of the
transcript, and his newspaper published a version of the remarks. Id., 555 A.2d at 1236-37. On appeal, the state
supreme court upheld a civil liability award of $1,000 against the newspaper for its unlawful disclosure, conclud-
ing that individuals' rights to privacy outweighed the interest in public disclosure of such private telephone conver-
sations. Id. at 370-74, 555 A.2d at 1236-40.
In Cape Publications, parents had filed suit against a newspaper and a reporter when the reporter lawfully
obtained child abuse information in relation to a trial and the newspaper published the information. 549 So. 2d at
1374. The state supreme court relied on the strong public interest in judicial proceedings, citing Cox, id. at 1378,
the fact that the information was lawfully obtained, citing Florida Star, id. at 1378-79, and the determination
that the child abuse cases are newsworthy or of legitimate public concern, citing Landmark Communications, id.
at 1378. After holding on these grounds, the state court expressly did not reach the constitutionality of the stat-
utes that maintain the confidentiality of child welfare records. Because the government provided the information.
however inadvertently, it was held legitimately within public domain and thus available to the media. Id. at 1378-
79.
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prevail appears nonexistent. To lament the passing of the private facts tort
seems pointless."" It lacks usefulness as a protection of individuals or a check
on the media. However, to encourage some other prohibition on publication of
rape victims' names or any other kind of media check because of anger at some
publishers or broadcasters seems overly reactive and perhaps even dangerous.'14
While distaste for certain actions of the media could not be considered novel
today," 2 the development of media power can.1' The primary reason is televi-
sion, whose instantaneous nature and intrusive presence helped fuel the growth
in complaints from the public over media fairness."4 The refrain, "Why do they
hate us," arises throughout the industry.4 5 Those fears may provide the force
that restrains the industry and helps eliminate the complaints.
Even if such internal controls fail to make an immediate impact on the
media, external restrictions imposed by the courts and legislature should be
avoided. The media's role as information conduit remains vital, and, while the
concern that any restriction will lead to more restrictions and the erosion of
media effectiveness in their role may seem like a worn rallying cry of journalists
to some, the concern remains valid,"46 In the Florida Star case, Justice White
laments that, in balancing first amendment and privacy concerns, "we hit the
bottom of the slippery slope."" 4 7 Perhaps, but climbing back up for the sake of a
confusing tort seems to hold little purpose and devising methods to prohibit
communication seems only to create more troubles.
Lorelei Van Wey
140. "The news and information media have been saddled with this nuisance of a communicative tort for too
long." Zuckman, supra note 12, at 265.
141. Cf. Note, supra note 16, at 1096 (state should be able to regulate disclosure of a rape victim's name),
and Leading Cases. Constitutional Law, 103 HARV. L. REv. 259, 260 (1989) ("the Court has facilitated news-
gathering at the expense of news subjects'--and, ultimately, the public's-best interests").
142. Warren and Brandeis found the press intrusive in 1890. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 195-96.
See Patterson, It's the Plaintiffs First Amendment Too, NIEMAN REP., Winter 1988, at 4 (today "[s]ome see a
malevolent press out to wreck American institutions and destroy a decent measure of privacy for individuals; the
press generally sees itself as an embattled and unappreciated servant of the public trying to hold misleaders to
account and to slice through their baloney.")
143. Clurman, A Very Cold Winter, NIEMAN REP., Winter 1988, at 8 ("[tlhe modern news media were born
in the '50s, revealed their strength in the '60s, asserted it in the '70s and were hammered for it in the '80s").
144. Id. at 8, 10, 13. See Clurman, Afterthoughts, NIEMAN REP., Autumn 1989, at 36.
145. Clurman, supra note 143, at 11-12.
146. Patterson, supra note 142, at 34.
147. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2619 (White, J., dissenting).
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